Nonrandom assignment of students to teachers can bias value-added estimates of teachers' causal effects. Rothstein (2008 Rothstein ( , 2010 shows that typical value-added models indicate large counterfactual effects of fifthgrade teachers on students' fourth-grade learning, indicating that classroom assignments are far from random. This article quantifies the resulting biases in estimates of fifth-grade teachers' causal effects from several valueadded models, under varying assumptions about the assignment process. If assignments are assumed to depend only on observables, the most commonly used specifications are subject to important bias, but other feasible specifications are nearly free of bias. I also consider the case in which assignments depend on unobserved variables. I use the across-classroom variance of observables to calibrate several models of the sorting process. Results indicate that even the best feasible value-added models may be substantially biased, with the magnitude of the bias depending on the amount of information available for use in classroom assignments.
INTRODUCTION
Proposals to consider teacher quality in hiring, compensation, and retention require adequate measures of quality. This is increasingly defined in terms of educational outputs, as reflected in student performance, rather than by teacher inputs like graduate degrees and experience. In order for output-based quality measures to be of use, they must reflect teachers' causal effects on the student outcomes of interest, not preexisting differences among students for which the teacher cannot be given credit or blame.
If students were known to be randomly assigned to teachers, there would be no systematic differences in students' potential outcomes across teachers, so straightforward comparisons of mean end-of-year achievement would provide unbiased estimates of teachers' effects.
1 But there are many reasons for teachers not to be randomly assigned. Principals may attempt to group students of similar ability together to permit more focused teaching to students' skill levels, or they may try to spread high-and low-ability students across classrooms. Teachers who are thought to be particularly skilled at teaching reading skills, for example, may be assigned students who are in need of extra reading help. Students who are known to create trouble together may be intentionally assigned to different classrooms. Teachers who the principal would like to reward may be given the easiest-to-teach students, with troublemakers assigned to disfavored teachers in an effort to drive them away. 2 Finally, parents, perceiving teacher assignments as important determinants of their children's success, may intervene to ensure that their children are given a favored teacher or kept away from a disfavored one. Given nonrandom assignments, the evaluation challenge in teacher effect modeling is to distinguish teachers' causal effects from the effects of preexisting differences between the students in their classrooms. If the determinants of classroom assignments are not adequately controlled, teacher effect estimates will be biased. This bias is not averaged away even in large samples, and existing methods for adjusting estimates for sampling error will not in general remove its effects from teacher rankings.
The premise of value-added models (VAMs) is that differences in the difficulty of the task faced can be controlled by holding teachers responsible for 1. There would still be the problem of accounting for sampling variation in the estimates. Because each teacher is in contact with only a few dozen students per year, annual estimates of teacher effects are quite noisy, and compensation schemes based on these estimates would have to be robust to the misidentification of teacher quality that results from this noise. But existing strategies-for example, the empirical Bayes approach used by or the similar best linear unbiased predictor used by the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (Sanders and Horn 1994)-suggest methods for doing this. 2. This aspect of assignments is likely to depend on the accountability metric in place. If teachers are rewarded for their value added and if value-added estimates can be biased by systematic student assignment, the pattern of assignments is likely to change so that favored teachers benefit from this bias and disfavored ones are penalized.
students' gains over the course of the year rather than for their absolute endof-year achievement levels. Rothstein (2008 Rothstein ( , 2010 shows that this is false. Students are sorted across classrooms in ways that correlate with both their score levels and their gains. Specifically, fourth-grade gains are highly nonrandomly sorted across fifth-grade classrooms, with nearly as much across-class variation as in fifth-grade gains. Because annual achievement tends to revert quickly toward a student-specific mean, a student with a fourth-grade gain that exceeds the average by one standard deviation (SD) can be expected to fall short of the average in fifth grade by about 0.4 SDs. Existing VAMs attribute this shortfall to the fifth-grade teacher. A teacher assigned students with high fourth-grade gains in the previous year will look like a bad teacher through no fault of her own, while a teacher whose students posted poor gains in the previous year will be credited for their predictable reversion to trend. Although Rothstein (2008 Rothstein ( , 2010 documents substantial nonrandomness in teacher assignments that violates the restriction of common VAMs, he does not directly estimate the magnitude of the resulting biases, and he provides little evidence about the prospects for correcting them via more sophisticated controls for students ' past achievement trends. 3 This article attempts to quantify the bias created by nonrandom assignment in several value-added specifications. Three conditions govern the bias. It depends first on the amount of information available for use in the classroom assignment process about students' potential end-of-year achievement or annual gain, second on the importance attached to this information in assignments, and third on the degree to which the control variables included in the value-added specification can absorb the information used in assignments.
Value-added studies frequently distinguish between the effect of having a particular teacher and the effect of being in a particular classroom, with the former included in the latter. I take the classroom effect-the causal effect of being in one classroom as opposed to another in the same school-as the parameter of interest. 4 This avoids the problem of distinguishing different components of the classroom effect, the most obvious being the effects of teacher quality and peers. That problem is complex even when classroom assignments are random and is much more so with nonrandom assignments.
But the identification of classroom effects is a necessary precondition for the larger problem of isolating teachers' causal effects, and by focusing on the first problem I can place a lower bound on the bias in estimates of teachers' effects that is produced by the assignment process. I distinguish between two forms of nonrandom assignments: those that depend only on variables that are observed by the analyst, with random assignment conditional on those, and those that depend in addition on information known to participants in the assignment process but not observed by the researcher. In the former case, "selection on observables," bias in classroom effect estimates can be measured directly. In the latter, the magnitude of the bias can be quantified only with assumptions about the amount and nature of information that is used in classroom assignments. I take an approach that is in the spirit of Altonji, Elder, and Taber's (2005) assumption that sorting on unobserved variables resembles sorting on observables, though the specific assumptions differ: where Altonji, Elder, and Taber assume that sorting is incidental and is equally correlated with observed and unobserved determinants of the outcome variable of interest, I assume that the sorting is intentional and that it depends on a limited set of predictors that are observed by the school principal, 5 a subset of which are observed by the researcher as well. Altonji, Elder, and Taber's assumption represents a limiting case for my analysis, in which the principal can perfectly predict students' end-of-year achievement and gains before making teacher assignments. I also consider several more plausible scenarios for the principal's role in assignments. Section 2 describes the data. In section 3, I demonstrate that past test scores and behavioral variables are strongly predictive of future achievement and achievement gains. Section 4 summarizes the evidence from Rothstein (2008 Rothstein ( , 2010 that teacher assignments are importantly correlated with past scores. In section 5, I examine the bias that arises in several common VAMs if classroom assignments are random conditional on the observed variables. Section 6 describes the methodology for assessing the bias that arises if parents and principals have more information about students' potential learning growth than is available in research data sets. Section 7 presents the results of the analysis of selection on unobservables. Section 8 concludes.
DATA
I work with longitudinal administrative data on students in public elementary schools in North Carolina, assembled and distributed by the North Carolina 5. For simplicity, I discuss class assignments as the outcome of principals' decisions. This is not meant to restrict the principal to be the only determinant of these assignments; the principal's decision might reflect input from parents, teachers, and the student him-or herself.
Education Research Data Center. North Carolina has been a leader in the development of linked longitudinal data on student achievement, and the North Carolina data have been used for several previous value-added analyses (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2006; Goldhaber 2007 ).
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I focus on the value added by fifth-grade teachers in 2000-1. I use annual end-of-year tests that were given in grades 3-5, as well as pretests given at the beginning of third grade. The tests purport to use a "developmental" scale, and the score scale is intended to be meaningful (i.e., scores are cardinal and not simply ordinal measures) both across grades and across the distribution within grades.
7 I standardize scores so that the population mean is zero and the standard deviation is one in third grade; by using the same standardization in all grades I preserve the comparability of scores across grades. The North Carolina data do not identify students' teachers directly, but they do identify the person who administered the end-of-grade tests. In the elementary grades, this was usually the regular teacher. I follow Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2006) in using a linked personnel database to identify test administrators with regular teaching assignments. I count a match as valid if the test administrator taught a self-contained (all day, all subject) fifth-grade class that was not coded as special education or honors and if at least half of the tests administered were to fifth-grade students. Seventy-three percent of fifth-grade tests were administered by teachers who are valid by this definition.
My analysis focuses on reading scores, though similar results obtain for math scores. My sample consists of students who were in fifth grade in 2000-1, with a valid teacher assignment in that year, for whom I have complete test score data in grades 3-5. Table 1A presents summary statistics and a correlation table for reading scores on the third-grade pretest: the end-of-grade tests in third, fourth, and fifth grades; and the fifth-grade gain score (defined as the difference between the fourth-and fifth-grade scores). Mean scores in my complete data sample are about 0.07 standard deviations higher than in the population in every grade. Scores are correlated about 0.80 in adjacent grades (lower for the third-grade pretest, which is substantially shorter), with slightly reduced correlations across longer time spans. Fifth-grade gains are weakly positively correlated (+0.07) with fifth-grade score levels and strongly 6. North Carolina was one of the first two states approved by the U.S. Department of Education to use growth-based accountability models in place of the status-based metrics that are otherwise required under No Child Left Behind. 7. It is not clear that a scale with this property is even possible (Martineau 2006) , or even if it is how one would know whether a test's scale has the property. Nevertheless, value-added modeling, as typically practiced, is difficult to justify if scores are not interval scaled both across and within grades. See Ballou (2002) and Yen (1986) . The analysis here is not sensitive to violations of this property, though if it does not hold, the value-added estimators considered (here and elsewhere in the literature) are difficult to justify. See Rothstein (2008) . negatively correlated (−0.52) with fourth-grade scores. They are notably negatively correlated (−0.25) with third-grade scores as well. Observed scores are noisy measures of true achievement. The degree of measurement error in test scores is usually measured by the "test-retest reliability," the correlation between students' scores on alternative forms of the same test administered a short interval apart.
8 A 1996 report estimates that the test-retest reliability of the North Carolina seventh-grade reading test is 0.86 (Sanford 1996, p. 45) . Unfortunately, test-retest studies have not been conducted for other grades. Under the assumption that individual item reliability is constant across grades and that item responses are independent, the seventh-grade reliability can be extended to the shorter tests in earlier grades.
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Doing so, I estimate that the grade 3 pretest has reliability 0.72, the grade 3 end-of-grade test has reliability 0.84, and the tests in grades 4 and 5 have reliability 0.86. I treat these as known, without sampling error.
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8. Test makers often report alternative measures of reliability-for example, internal consistency measures that are based on correlations between a student's scores on different subsets of questions. The internal-consistency reliabilities for the tests in grades 3, 4, and 5, respectively, are 0.92, 0.94, and 0.93 (Sanford 1996, p. 45) . The corresponding statistic for the grade 3 pretest used for the cohort under consideration is not reported, but a more recent form of the test has reliability 0.82 (as compared with 0.92 in the corresponding tests in grades 3-5; see Bazemore 2004, p. 63) . These statistics are computed under the assumption that responses are independent across questions; common shocks (e.g., a cold on test day) would lead these methods to overstate the test's reliability. 9. If item responses are not independent, reliability will be less sensitive to test length, and I will most likely understate the reliability of the (relatively short) third-grade pretest. 10. The sample for the test-retest study was only seventy students, in three classrooms. If the seventy observations are independent, an approximate confidence interval for the grade 7 test reliability is A known reliability allows me to compute summary statistics for true achievement, net of measurement error, assuming that errors are independent across grades. These are reported in Table 1B . The correlation between a student's true achievement in adjacent grades is approximately 0.96. The fifth-grade gain is strongly negatively correlated with achievement levels in all grades.
One can examine across-grade correlations in gain scores as well as in score levels. The correlation between measured grade 4 and grade 5 gains is −0.42. Measurement error in the annual test scores biases this downward, but even when corrected the correlation remains negative. Thus students with above-average gains in grade 4 will, on average, have below-average gains the following year. To the extent that such students are systematically assigned to particular teachers, value-added models that fail to account for this mean reversion will be biased against those teachers.
PREDICTIONS OF GRADE 5 ACHIEVEMENT AND GAINS
The relevance of classroom assignments for value-added estimation depends crucially on the degree to which students' gains are predictable based on prior information. If fourth-grade characteristics are not at all predictive of (0.78, 0.91), though within-classroom dependence would imply a wider interval. Note also that a given test will have higher reliability in a heterogeneous population than in a homogeneous one. The likely homogeneity of the test-retest sample suggests that the reliability in the population of North Carolina students is probably higher than was indicated. fifth-grade gains, then even assignment on the basis of those characteristics will not create bias in fifth-grade VAMs. Table 2 presents several specifications for students' reading scores at the end of grade 5, using prior scores and other predetermined variables as explanatory variables. Because it is almost certainly more difficult to control for the sorting of students across schools than within, and because I focus in this article on identifying differences in teachers' effects within schools, I consider only specifications for withinschool variation in fifth-grade scores. The first column shows that 87 percent of the variance in fifth-grade scores is within schools. Column 2 adds the fourth-grade reading score. This has a coefficient of 0.680; neither zero nor one is within the confidence interval. The inclusion of the fourth-grade score increases the model's R 2 by 0.55; fourth-grade scores explain 63.5 percent of the within-school variation in fifth-grade scores. Column 3 adds to the specification reading scores from the beginning and end of grade 3. Both are significant predictors of fifth-grade scores. Their inclusion lowers the fourth-grade score coefficient by about one-third and raises the within-school R 2 by 0.045. Column 4 adds three lagged scores on the math exam. Again, all are significant. The within-school R 2 is 0.058 higher than in the specification with just a single lagged reading score. Column 5 adds twenty-eight additional covariates, measured in grade 4, that might help to predict students' grade 5 achievement. These include race, gender, and free lunch status indicators; measures of parental education; various categories of "exceptionality" and learning disabilities; and measures of the time spent on homework and watching TV. These are jointly highly significant, though their inclusion raises the explained share of variance by only 0.003. The available variables-nearly all of which were readily observable when students were assigned to fifth-grade classrooms-explain nearly 70 percent of the within-school variation in students' grade 5 test scores. Moreover, this substantially understates the predictability of student achievement. Recall from section 2 that 14 percent of the variance in measured fifth-grade scores is noise that would not even persist into a second administration of the test a week later. This noise is irrelevant to the predictability of achievement and is uncorrelated with all predictor variables. Table 2 also shows estimates of the explained share of the within-school variance of true achievement, net of this transitory noise. These range from 0.764 with just the fourth-grade score to 0.837 with the full set of controls.
Of course, predictions of end-of-year scores are easy: it should not be surprising that students who score highly in fourth grade tend to continue to earn high scores in fifth grade, and all VAMs control for this variation in one way or another. A harder task is to predict fifth-grade gains. As long as the fourth-grade score is included as a covariate, the coefficients in a prediction Notes: All columns include fixed effects for 838 schools. Standard errors, clustered at the school level, are in parentheses. Non-test covariates in column 5 include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, learning disabilities in reading or in any area, Title 1 participation, each possible "exceptionality" (gifted, hearing impaired, mentally handicapped, etc.), parental years of education, free and reduced price lunch participation, and reporting never doing any homework, as well as a linear control for number of hours of TV watched each school day (plus a dummy for missing values for this variable).
equation for gains are identical to those for levels, save that the fourth-grade score coefficient is reduced by 1. But the explained share of variance is much lower. The bottom rows of table 2 show the R 2 statistics for specifications that take grade 5 gains as the dependent variable. These range from 0.279 to 0.398 within schools. The first-difference transformation does not eliminate predictability; the principal clearly has substantial information at his disposal for the prediction of student gain scores.
11
11. Neither coefficients nor fit statistics can be directly converted to those that would be seen for the true gain score, net of measurement error, because measurement error in the fourth-grade score appears on both sides of the equation for fifth-grade gains. I discuss in section 6 how the coefficients of specifications for true gains can be recovered from the estimates in table 2. True gains are quite predictable as well. Also relevant to the analysis below is the value of past gains for predicting future scores and gains. Table 3 presents specifications using grade 4 gains as explanatory variables. These explain only 0.2 percent of the within-school variance in fifth-grade achievement but 18.2 percent of the variance in fifth-grade gains.
EVIDENCE FOR NONRANDOM ASSIGNMENT
The simplest VAM estimates each teacher's effect as the average gain score of her students.
12 In order to attribute this average gain to the teacher, it must be the case that the information used to make teaching assignments is uninformative about students' potential gains, conditional on any control variables. As shown in section 3, prior achievement and gains are strongly predictive of future scores and gains, so correlations between teacher assignments and past gains would violate the simple VAMs identifying assumption. Rothstein (2008 Rothstein ( , 2010 tests for effects of fifth-grade teachers on fourth-grade gains. Given the evidence in table 3, effects of this sort would indicate that expected 12. This is not a widely used model. However, it is quite similar to the implicit model of the most widely used VAM, the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (see Sanders, Saxton, and Horn 1997) . This is specified as a mixed model for level scores that depend on the full history of classroom assignments, but its key identifying assumption is essentially that the simple model that I consider here is an unbiased estimator of teachers' causal effects.
fifth-grade gains are not balanced across fifth-grade classrooms and that the simple VAM is biased. Let A ig be the test score for student i at the end of grade g. The grade g gain is defined as A ig ≡ A ig − A i,g −1 . Let S ig be a vector of indicators for the school attended in grade g and let T ig be a set of teacher indicators. The simple value-added model is based on the regression of gains on school and teacher indicators, with the teacher coefficients normalized to mean zero within each school:
In order for this regression to yield unbiased estimates, unobserved determinants of annual gains must be uncorrelated with T ig . I evaluate this assumption by substituting in equation 1 the student's gain in some prior year h < g :
The causal effect of the grade g teacher on the gain in grade h is necessarily zero. A nonzero coefficientβ h can therefore arise only if the error in grade h, ε ih , is correlated with the grade g teacher assignment-that is, if teacher assignments in grade g depend on past outcomes. As we have seen, ε ih is correlated with ε ig , so any such correlation means the simple VAM will yield a biased estimate of the effect of the grade g teacher on the grade g gain.
13 Table 4 presents estimates of fifth-grade teachers' coefficients in models for gain scores in grades 5, 4, and 3, using specifications 1 and 2. To permit comparisons across models, I use a balanced panel of students who attended the same school for all three grades. These are similar to those reported in table 3 of Rothstein (2008) , albeit estimated from a slightly different sample.
We begin with the model for grade 5 gains. The 3,013 elements of theβ 5 vector (normalized to mean zero across all fifth-grade teachers at the school) can be summarized by their standard deviation, 0.152, shown in column 1. 14 I also report an adjusted standard deviation that subtracts from the acrossteacher variance the contribution of sampling error to this variance (Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander 2007; Rothstein 2008) . This adjusted standard deviation, 13. Rothstein (2010) formalizes the test and discusses its interpretation in greater detail than is possible here. Note that the grade h teacher is a potential omitted variable in equation 2, and a correlation between T ig and T ih could yield a nonzeroβ h even if grade g classroom assignments do not depend on ε ih . Rothstein (2010) shows that the inclusion of controls for T ih has essentially no effect on the results. 14. Across-teacher means and standard deviations are weighted by the number of students taught, and degrees of freedom are adjusted for the normalization ofβ 5 . Further details of the methods are available in Rothstein (2008) . which estimates the variability of the true β coefficients net of sampling error, is 0.107; a teacher who is one standard deviation better than average has students who gain one-tenth of a standard deviation (of achievement levels) relative to the average over the course of the year. This resembles existing estimates (Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander 2007; Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger 2008; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005) .
The remaining columns present counterfactual estimates that vary only the dependent variable. Column 2 presents estimates for fourth-grade gains. We know that there are no causal effects of fifth-grade teachers on fourthgrade gains (i.e., thatβ 4 = 0), so any nonzero coefficients in this specification are indicative of student sorting. The hypothesis thatβ 4 = 0 is decisively rejected, and indeed there is nearly as much variation in the elements of β 4 as in those ofβ 5 : the sampling-adjusted standard deviation of fifth-grade teachers' normalized effects on fourth-grade gains is 0.080, nearly as large as that for fifth-grade gains. Column 3 presents an analogous model in which the dependent variable is the third-grade gain, the difference between the student's score on the end-of-grade reading test and the beginning-of-year pretest. We see even larger apparent effects of fifth-grade teachers here.
The lower portion of table 4 presents correlations among the estimates of the coefficient vectors β 5 ,β 4 , andβ 3 , first unadjusted for sampling error and then adjusted. Adjacent coefficients are highly negatively correlated, both before and after the adjustment for sampling error, but there is nearly no correlation between β 5 andβ 3 .
Two of these correlations are of particular interest here. First, corr (β 5 ,β 4 ) = −0.35. This indicates that fifth-grade teachers who appear (by the simple model 1) to have high value added tend to be those whose students experienced below-average gains in grade 4. As noted earlier, gains are negatively autocorrelated at the student level; at least a portion of the variation in estimated fifth-grade value added apparently reflects predictable consequences of nonrandom student assignments.
The second interesting correlation is that betweenβ 4 andβ 3 , −0.36. One hypothesis that could explain the presence of counterfactual effects of fifthgrade teachers on earlier grades' gains is that students differ systematically in their rate of gain, and classroom assignments depend in part on that rate. Rothstein (2008) refers to this explanation as "static tracking"-the determinants of classroom assignments are constant across grades, and conditional on these determinants the test score in grade g does not affect the teacher assignment in g + 1. In the presence of static tracking, the bias in teacher effects coming from nonrandom assignment can be absorbed by pooling data on a student's gains across several grades and including student fixed effects in the specification. This sort of specification is used by Harris and Sass (2006) , Koedel and Betts (2007) , Jacob and Lefgren (2008) , Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) , and Boyd et al. (2008) , among others.
As Rothstein (2008) notes, static tracking implies that in simple specifications like those in table 4 the coefficients for the grade g teacher on gains in grades h and k (h, k < g) should be identical, up to sampling error. In other words, corr (β 4 ,β 3 ) = 1. This restriction does not even approximately hold in the data. Classroom assignments are evidently not made on the basis of permanent student characteristics but respond dynamically to annual student performance.
15 This implies that student fixed effects specifications provide inconsistent estimates of teachers' causal effects. The only way to control for nonrandom classroom assignments while permitting consistent estimation of teachers' effects is to measure the determinants of assignments directly.
15. Again, this conclusion is supportable only if the correlation betweenβ 4 andβ 3 differs from one in specifications that include controls for fourth-and third-grade teachers, where those in table 2 do not. The correlation is nearly identical when these controls are included.
Many value-added specifications (e.g., Gordon, Kane, and Staiger 2006; Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger 2008; Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander 2007; Jacob and Lefgren 2008) control for the baseline score, in effect modeling the endof-year score as a function of the beginning-of-year score and the teacher assignment. These specifications are robust to dynamic teacher assignments of a very restricted form: unless teacher assignments are random conditional on the baseline score, estimates will still be biased. The estimates in tables 2 and 3 indicate that there is a great deal of information available to principals about students' potential gains above and beyond that provided by the lagged score; there is no reason to expect that the use of this information in forming classroom assignments can be absorbed with simple controls. I show below that the once-lagged score specification is rejected by the data.
SELECTION ON OBSERVABLES
Strategies for isolating causal effects in the presence of nonrandom assignment of treatment (in this case, of classroom assignments) depend importantly on whether determinants of treatment are observed or unobserved. Accordingly, I treat the two cases separately. I defer discussion of the selection-onunobservables case to section 6. In this section, I assume that selection is solely on observables: fifth-grade teacher assignments are random conditional on the available variables measured in fourth grade. Under this assumption, bias can be avoided by controlling for the full set of observables in the VAM. Models that use less complete controls may be biased if the included variables are unable to absorb all the nonrandomness of teacher assignments. Note that no harm is done by controlling for variables that are not used in teacher assignments. Accordingly, I allow teacher assignments to depend on any or all of the variables included in column 5 of table 2-the history of math and reading test scores plus a set of demographic and behavioral variables as measured in grade 4. I label these variables X i4 . If fifth-grade classroom assignments are in fact random conditional on X i4 , then the effects of fifth-grade teachers can be estimated via a simple regression of fifth-grade gains on fifth-grade school and teacher indicators with controls for the X i4 variables:
Note that fourth-grade reading and math scores are included in X i 4 . Thus equation 3 is identical to a regression that uses the fifth-grade score (rather than the gain) as the dependent variable, because this simply adds A i 4 to both sides.
Value-added models rarely have access to the full set of control variables included in X i4 . Omission of any variable that influences classroom assignments may produce bias in the estimated teacher effects. To evaluate the importance of this-under the maintained assumption of selection on observables-I compare estimates from equation 3 with those obtained from three VAMs with less complete controls:
VAM1 credits each teacher with the average achievement of students in her class (less the school-and grade-level average). I include this "levels" specification, which few would advocate, solely as the basis for comparison with more reasonable models. VAM2 effectively controls for students' fourth-grade scores, constraining their coefficients to one. Teachers are credited with students' average gain scores (again relative to the school-grade average). This is the basic specification used in most value-added policy. VAM3 controls for students' fourth-grade achievement and estimates the coefficient on the lagged score rather than constraining it to one. In this model, teachers are credited with their students' performance relative to other students in the same school and grade with the same beginning-of-year scores. Finally, VAM4 controls not just for last year's score but for the two prior scores as well. (The thirdgrade pretest is denoted A i2 here.) This sort of specification is not widely used. It could in principle be used in some value-added implementations, though unavoidable data limitations would prevent its widespread adoption. Most importantly, this VAM is not available for the assessment of teachers in the first three grades in which students are tested.
For each model, I compute the standard deviation across teachers of b and of the bias relative to the coefficient vector from the richer specification 3, b − β. A useful summary statistic is the variance of the bias relative to that of teachers' "true" effects (as indicated by equation 3), V(b − β)/V(β). I also compute the correlation between the bias and the true effect, corr (b − β, β): it is helpful to know whether good teachers (at least as indicated by the baseline model 3) are helped or hurt by the assignment process. A strong positive correlation between true effects and the bias would imply that teacher rankings are not much affected by sorting bias, while a negative correlation would indicate that biases from nonrandom assignments mask differences in true teacher quality. Table 5 presents the results. Each statistic is computed first from the estimated coefficients (in the first panel), then adjusted for the influence of sampling error (second panel). The baseline specification indicates that the Notes: Specification that controls for "all observables" includes controls for math and reading scores in grades 2, 3, and 4; indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, learning disabilities in reading or any area, Title 1 participation, each possible "exceptionality" (gifted, hearing impaired, mentally handicapped, etc.), parental years of education, free and reduced price lunch participation, and reporting never doing any homework; and a linear control for the number of hours of TV watched each school day (plus a dummy for missing values for this variable).
standard deviation of teachers' effects is 0.096, or 0.124 before the adjustment for sampling error. VAM1 indicates much more variability of teacher effects, though this is primarily bias-the bias in this specification is more than three times as large (in variance terms) as the true variability that we are attempting to measure. The specification for gain scores, VAM2, eliminates much of the bias, but its variance is still half that of the true effects. VAM3, controlling for the fourth-grade score, cuts the standard deviation of the bias in half; here the variance of the bias is 13 percent of that of the quality signal. This is small in comparison with the previous models but still substantial enough to represent a problem for policy. In each case, biases are only weakly correlated with true coefficients (column 4). VAM4 eliminates nearly all the bias relative to the richer selection-onobservables specification. This is unsurprising. Recall that table 2 indicated that the control variables included in equation 3 but excluded from VAM4 added only 0.3 percent to the explained share of variance of fifth-grade achievement and 0.6 percent to the explained share of variance of fifth-grade gains. Thus my assumption that specification 3 permits unbiased estimation of teachers' causal effects implies that omitted variables bias in VAM4 is negligible. To understand the true potential for bias in this specification, we will need to consider the impact of selection on information that is unobserved in my sample but is available for use in forming classroom assignments. I develop methods for assessing this in the next section.
A MODEL OF TRACKING ON UNOBSERVABLES
There is no good reason to think that classroom assignments depend only on the variables available in my data. Indeed, the presence of noise in the measured test score history strongly suggests otherwise. A principal or parent would almost certainly be able to form a less noisy measure of students' achievement each year by combining test scores with other measures (e.g., grades) that I do not observe. In this section I develop a framework in which classroom assignments depend on the observed variables and on unobserved variables that have known correlations with the observables. This permits computation of the variance across teachers of the bias in feasible estimates of β, though not the bias in any individual teacher's estimated effect.
In the selection-on-observables analysis in section 5, I allowed for the possibility that classroom assignments depended on only a subset of the observed variables. The cost of allowing for selection on unobservables is that we must rule that possibility out: I require here that the set of variables that influence classroom assignments be known precisely. I assume that assignments depend on an index formed by averaging a set of prespecified variables with weights that best predict student outcomes. Assignments are assumed to be uncorrelated with later outcomes conditional on this index.
I assume that the researcher is able to observe some but not all the variables from which the prediction index is formed. When all the predictor variables are observed, the setup collapses to the selection-on-observables model discussed in section 5. When only a subset is observed, the distribution of the observed variables across classrooms can be used to identify the importance of predicted outcomes, relative to the residual, in forming classroom assignments. I develop the model in several parts. I begin by describing the assumed assignment process, then discuss the implications of these assignments for VAM estimation, and finally describe how the North Carolina data can be used to calibrate the model and to estimate the degree of bias in feasible VAMs that is implied by the assumed assignment process. The model is presented in terms of a principal who uses the information available to her to make classroom assignments. This is shorthand. Classroom assignments may depend on negotiation among principals, teachers, students, and parents, each of whom may observe different aspects of the student. The "principal" in my model is a black box that takes all the information available to the various agents and outputs a classroom assignment.
Classroom Assignments
I assume that the principal observes three classes of characteristics for each student: Z, characteristics that are useful predictors of student outcomes and are also observed by the data analyst; W, predictor variables that are not observed by the analyst; and η, determinants of classroom assignments that are not predictive of the academic outcomes analyzed in VAMs. Let Y represent the outcome. Y might refer to true gains or measured gains; we will see below that this has important consequences for the analysis.
We can distinguish between the teacher's true causal effect, Tβ, and the other components of the outcome, ω = Y − Tβ. The challenge in value-added modeling is that the classroom assignment T may depend on ω, or at least on that part of ω that is known to the principal. Let I ≡ E[ω | Z, W] be the principal's prediction of ω, and let ε = ω − I. We can measure the amount of information available to the principal by V(I)/V(ω) = σ 2 I /(σ 2 I + σ 2 ε ). I assume that classroom assignments depend on Z and W only through the index I. This is central to my strategy because it enables me to recover the amount of sorting on the unobserved variables W by measuring the degree of sorting on the observed variables Z. Assignments may depend in part on the nonpredictive variables, η, however. It is convenient to normalize η to be a single variable that is orthogonal to all other variables (i.e., to Z, W, and ε) and is scaled so that assignments depend on the simple sum λ ≡ I + η. Because η is never observed by the analyst, this carries no loss of generality. I also impose the more restrictive assumption that {I, η, ε} are jointly normally distributed.
Students are sorted perfectly on λ into classes. 16 That is, all the students assigned to a particular teacher have the same λ value. The importance of predicted outcomes in assignments is controlled by σ 16. This is at best an approximation. A typical school has three to five classes per grade; even if these classes are perfectly stratified, λ will have considerable heterogeneity within classes. With less than perfect sorting, my methods will understate the importance of I (relative to η) in classroom assignments and therefore will understate the bias in VAMs due to these assignments. The basic approach could be extended to stratification on λ across a finite number of classes (so that one class has students with λ ∈ (−∞, c 1 ), another has λ ∈ (c 1 , c 2 ), etc.), at the cost of considerable additional complexity.
The Principal's Prediction
In order to make further progress, we need to specify the information available to the principal for use in predicting outcomes (i.e., the variables Z and W). I consider several scenarios in the empirical analysis below. Intermediate cases between selection on observables and perfect predictability of future outcomes are the most realistic and I focus on these, though I also include the limiting cases for comparison. I begin with base cases in which selection is on observables, as in section 5: A. The principal has no information about future achievement gains beyond that contained in the fourth-grade test score (Z = {A 4 }; W = {ø}).
B. The principal observes the test score history but has no additional information about achievement gains (Z = {A 2 , A 3 , A 4 }; W = {ø}).
Note that scenarios A and B are falsified by the evidence in table 2: because the principal can observe all the fourth-grade variables that are available in my data, the fact that these variables are useful in predicting gains indicates that the principal has more information about potential gains than just the score history. Nevertheless, these scenarios provide useful baselines.
A second set of scenarios allows the principal to be better able to disentangle the signal and noise components of the test score history than can the econometrician. The principal knows students and has access to course grades and other indicators of student achievement with which to do this. A useful parameterization is to assume that the principal has access to k additional test score histories, each subject to its own error but with errors independent across tests. That is, if the true achievement history through fourth grade is A * = (A * 1 , . . . , A * 4 ), we assume that the value-added analyst observes only the measured achievement history A = A * + u. The principal observes this as well but also sees additional series {q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q k }. Each measures true achievement with independent error:
The q series can be thought of as representing grades, student evaluations, or classroom observations that are available to the principal but not reported in typical data sets. C. The principal observes the test score history that is available to the analyst and also observes k additional noisy achievement series (Z = {A}; W = {q 1 , . . . , q k }).
In the limit as k → ∞, this scenario converges to: D. The principal observes both the test score history and the true achievement history (Z = {A}; W = {A * }).
Note that the history of measured scores is not redundant in scenario D: when Y is the measured gain, the lagged measured score is informative about the measurement error component in ω (i.e., about
Even scenarios C and D are quite restrictive. As we will see, the true achievement history explains only a third of the within-school variance of true achievement gains, and it is plausible that the principal, who knows something of the child's family situation and emotional and cognitive development patterns, has information about the remaining portion.
E. The principal observes the test score history, the true achievement history, and an additional orthogonal signal of ω (Z = {A}; W = {A * , G}).
Results here will depend on the quantity of information that this additional signal is assumed to contain. Let the principal's prediction regression be E[ω|
F. The principal can predict the outcome perfectly (Z = {A}; W = {ω}). Note that this does not imply that students are perfectly sorted across classrooms on the basis of their potential outcomes. Recall that the principal is assumed to combine her prediction with an orthogonal term η and sort only on that combination. A principal who could perfectly predict outcomes might still assign poorly sorted classes if she thought ability mixing was desirable or if her goal of tracking students by ability was balanced against other objectives. Either would correspond to a large σ η 2 .
Even so, F is not a plausible scenario for the problem at hand because it is not realistic to suppose that principals can perfectly predict how well students will do over the course of a year. I include it because it illustrates the connection between the methods used here and those used by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) . Where in the earlier scenarios the principal observed all the variables available to the analyst plus a subset of the remaining component of students' gains, here the principal observes both components equally. As a result, both are equally sorted across classrooms. This corresponds to Altonji, Elder, and Taber's assumption that selection on unobservables is identical to selection on observables.
18 The six scenarios are summarized in table 6.
Bias in Under-Controlled Value-Added Models
We can write outcomes as the sum of teacher effects, the principal's prediction I, and the portion of outcomes that the principal was unable to predict:
17. When Y is the true gain and teachers have no true effects, this corresponds to f → (1− R 2 )/R 2 , where R 2 is the explained share of variance from a regression of A * onto A * . As I discuss below, R 2 is about 0.34. Thus this limit is just below 2. 18. Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) also consider intermediate cases in which the correlation between the unobserved determinants of selection and outcomes lies between zero (no selection) and the value corresponding to scenario F. The above framework can be seen as providing a basis for the choice of this correlation. Because I is a determinant of classroom assignments, it is correlated with T. That is, there are differences across classrooms in student outcomes that do not reflect teacher quality. Unbiased estimation of β requires controlling for I in a VAM specified as equation 4. 19 Unfortunately, equation 4 is not a feasible VAM. In most of the scenarios described above, the analyst observes only a subset of the variables used to construct I. The inability to control fully for I produces bias in the resulting estimates. It is easiest to characterize the bias in VAM2, which does not include any controls. I is an omitted variable here, and any across-classroom component of it represents bias inβ. The variance of this bias is equal to the across-classroom variance of I, σ
In a richer VAM that includes control variables Z, these variables may absorb some of the bias. Write the regression of I onto T and Z as I = T κ + Z π + ν. 20 We can rewrite equation 4 as
By construction, the terms in the final parentheses are uncorrelated with both T and Z so do not create bias in the coefficients. But notice that the T coefficient here combines the causal effect β with an additional bias term, κ. This reflects the fact that the principal is able to predict the outcome better than can the analyst and that he uses his superior prediction in forming classroom assignments. The structure developed above makes it possible to derive the magnitude of the bias (i.e., V(Tκ)). Intuitively, sorting of students to classrooms on the basis of I leads to a nonrandom distribution of Z across classrooms, and we can use this observable distribution to identify the importance of I in classroom assignments. Formally, recall that we have assumed that λ is perfectly sorted across classrooms and that the teacher's identity is informative about W and Z only through λ. This ensures that T κ = λξ for some scalar ξ . We can write I = λξ + Zπ + ν and therefore V(
. Moreover, recall that ξ and π are the coefficients from a regression of I onto λ and Z. Thus
) .
There are thus four parameters that determine the variance of the bias in the under-controlled model, two each deriving from the sorting process and from the choice of value-added specification. The sorting parameters are σ 2 I , concerning the principal's ability to predict students' outcomes, and σ 2 η , which controls the importance that the principal attaches to predicted outcomes in classroom assignments. The other parameters are cov(Z, I), which characterizes the relationship between the control variables included in the VAM and the principal's prediction, and V(Z), the readily measurable variance of the VAM control variables. With knowledge of these parameters-the calibration of which is described below-we can recover the variance of the bias term.
It is useful to consider three limiting cases. First, suppose that we control for all the predictive variables used by the principal (i.e., that we have selection on observables; W = {ø} and σ 2 η > 0). Then I = Z π , ξ = 0, and V(λξ ) = 0. This corresponds to the result that there is no bias with selection on observables as long as all relevant observables are controlled. Second, suppose that the principal places much more weight on variables unrelated to achievement than on predicted achievement in forming assignments, σ Given a scenario characterizing the principal's information, as described above, analyses of the variance of the observed Z variables and of their covariance across classrooms with Y can be used to calibrate the model. There are two preliminary steps to the calibration. First, the coefficients entering into the principal's prediction are estimated. This takes advantage of the observed relationship between gains and past scores and of the structure that the various scenarios place on the role of past scores in the principal's predictions. Second, the degree of sorting of students to classrooms is computed, using as an input the measured between-classroom variance in observed predictor variables. The mechanics of each step are described in detail in the appendix.
Once the parameters of the model are calibrated, the methods described in the previous subsection can be used to compute the variance of the bias in a given VAM. I consider value-added models VAM2, VAM3, and VAM4 from section 5. These are distinguished by the control variables that are included in models for the grade g gain. In each case, the control variables are subsets of the A vector, so it is straightforward to compute the covariance between these variables and the principal's prediction. As indicated by equation 6, this is sufficient to compute the variance of the bias term, V(Tκ). Table 2 presented prediction models for the fifth-grade test score as a function of test scores in earlier grades. As discussed above, these are readily converted into predictions of fifth-grade gains given the measured achievement history. Columns 1 and 2 of table 7 present the prediction coefficients when the predictor variables are the fourth-grade reading score (column 1) or the sequence of three prior reading scores (column 2). These correspond exactly to the coefficients from columns 2 and 3 of table 2 except that the fourth-grade score coefficient is reduced by one.
RESULTS

The Principal's Prediction
It may be that principals attempt to predict students' true gains rather than their measured gains. True gains are much harder to predict on the basis of past test scores. This is because the noisy fourth-grade test score achieves predictive power for the measured fifth-grade gain due to the presence of the same measurement error, u 4 , in both variables. Standard errors-invariables formulae (discussed in the appendix) can be used to obtain the best prediction equations for true gains. These are presented in columns 3 and 21. Extending the analysis to VAMs that control for non-test variables requires assumptions about the relationship between these variables and the Z and W variables seen by the principal. I do not pursue this here. Notes: See text for computational details. Standard errors (in parentheses) allow for school-level clustering but treat the test reliability as known perfectly. In practice, this is estimated, likely with substantial sampling and non-sampling error.
4 of table 7. 22 The within-school R 2 statistics and especially the prediction coefficients themselves are reduced in magnitude from the specifications for measured gains. True achievement gains are negatively correlated with past achievement levels but not dramatically so. 23 The model for measured gains in column 2 implicitly attaches a coefficient of around (−0.81 = −0.57 − −0.24) to the fourth-grade gain, while the corresponding model for true gains assigns a weight of only −0.02 ( = −0.07 − (−0.05)) to this gain. Table 8 presents estimates of the coefficients that the principal would apply to the available predictor variables in scenarios C and D. Columns 1-4 show prediction coefficients for measured gains, while columns 5-8 show coefficients for true gains. Columns 1 and 5 repeat the coefficients from scenario B, where only the measured test score history is available. Columns 2 and 6 show coefficients when a second, equally noisy series is available. Columns 3 and 7 show coefficients when two series are available in addition to measured scores (i.e., k = 2). Note that the coefficients on the observed and unobserved series are identical in columns 6 and 7, where the dependent variable is the 22. In principle, the coefficients of regressions that include math scores could be recovered as well. 23. Note that the overall R 2 statistics are higher in columns 3 and 4 than in 1 and 2, respectively. This is because the between-school component of measured achievement gains has very little measurement error in it. This means that a larger share of the variation of true gains than of measured gains is between schools, and also that the coefficients from within-school models for true gains are closer to the best prediction weights for across-school comparisons than are those from within-school models for measured gains. true gain, but that they differ in columns 2 and 3, where the measured history can be used to recover a portion of the measurement error in the measured gain. Columns 4 and 8 show predictions assuming that the principal is able to observe the history of true achievement. This substantially improves his ability to predict measured gains, because the measurement error portion of the fourth-grade score can be perfectly isolated, but adds relatively little to his ability to predict true gains over what could be done with three noisy histories. In no case is the coefficient on the fourth-grade score equal to zero. This implies (among other things) that VAM2, which imposes a coefficient of 1 on the lagged achievement level, is misspecified.
The Importance of Predictions in Classroom Assignments
Using the coefficients from tables 2, 7, and 8 and relying on an observed component of the principal's predictions, I can compute the variance decomposition of the principal's predictions, I, into within-and betweenclassroom components. For scenario C, I present estimates for k = 1 and k = 2. In scenario E, I present estimates for f = 0.25, f = 0.5, and f = 1; the scenario of perfect information, F, corresponds approximately to f = 1.96. The first column of table 9 shows the fraction of the within-school variance in gains that the principal is able to predict (i.e., σ 2 I /V(Y)) in each scenario, for true gains in the first panel and for measured gains in the second panel. The second column shows the across-school share of variance for the scenarios in which I is perfectly observable. Coefficients for between-school predictions may differ from those for the within-school predictions that I focus on, so I do not compute the across-school component of the incompletely observed indices. Column 3 shows the fraction of the within-school variation that is across classrooms. This equals σ 2 I /(σ 2 I + σ 2 η ), the weight that the principal must be placing on predicted outcomes relative to other factors in classroom assignments in order to generate the observed dispersion of past test scores across classrooms. Column 4 shows the across-classroom standard deviation in predicted gains.
Not surprisingly, the scenarios in which the principal has more information permit him or her to explain a larger share of the within-school variance in gains. Moreover, the richer prediction scenarios yield larger estimates of the across-classroom share of variance of predicted gains. Thus the more information that we permit the principal to have about the student's achievement history, the larger the bias that is implied for value-added specifications (like VAM2) that do not control for across-classroom sorting.
Sorting appears to be substantially more important when the principal is presumed to be using predictions of measured rather than true gains for classroom assignments. But this can be misleading: true gains are much less variable than measured gains (with a standard deviation less than half as large). Disparities between the panels are smaller in column 3, showing the fraction of the variance of predicted gains that is across classrooms. Even in this column, though, scenarios C-E show more sorting in the second panel. This is because measured scores form a smaller share of predicted measured gains than of predicted true gains in these scenarios (compare the R 2 statistic in column 1 of table 8 with those in columns 2-4, versus that in column 5 and those in 6-8), so the same sorting on observed variables corresponds to more overall sorting in the measured gain scenarios. Table 9 shows that the standard deviation of across-classroom differences in predicted gain scores ranges from 0.037 to 0.191, depending on the assumptions made about the information used in sorting. This variation is biased in specifications like VAM2 that do not control for classroom assignments. By comparison, the total across-classroom standard deviation of measured gain scores is 0.134. Thus even scenarios that restrict the principal to use little more than the observed variables in classroom assignments indicate biases in simple VAMs that are large relative to the effects that we hope to measure. Table 10 presents estimates of the standard deviation of the bias in richer models that include controls for students' prior achievement. Columns 1-3 of this table correspond to VAM2, VAM3, and VAM4, respectively. The bias in the simplest model (VAM2) is substantial in every scenario. Column 2 shows that the inclusion of a control for the prior year's test score eliminates much of the bias in VAM2, though there is important variation across scenarios. If we assume that the principal forms classroom assignments on the basis of his predictions of true gains (rather than measured gains) and that he has no information about students' potential gains beyond that contained in their achievement histories (as in scenarios B-D), the remaining bias in VAM3 is negligible. However, if we allow the principal to have additional information or if we assume that he sorts on the basis of predicted measured gains-as he might under an accountability regime that conditions rewards and punishments on measured gains rather than on unmeasurable true gains-then the bias remains important. If the principal observes even two independent achievement histories (e.g., the test score history plus an additional series, perhaps coming from teacher grades) and uses them in classroom assignments, the standard deviation of the bias in VAM3 is 0.043. Column 3 shows that much of the bias in VAM3 remains in VAM4, which controls for the full sequence of prior test scores. If the principal is assumed to observe the student's true achievement history plus another set of variables that explain an equal amount of student gains (i.e., scenario E with f = 1), the standard deviation of the bias ranges from 0.051 to 0.076, both large relative to the standard deviation of teachers' estimated "effects."
Bias in VAMs with Controls for Observables
DISCUSSION
Typical value-added analyses treat the process by which students are assigned to teachers as ignorable, under the implicit assumption that the statistical model used can absorb any systematic nonrandom assignment. This would be true if, for example, classroom assignments were random conditional on students' prior grade test scores. But there is little reason to think that this is an adequate characterization of classroom assignments. Principals have a great deal of information beyond the prior test score that is predictive of students' end-of-year achievement, and this information is unlikely to be ignored in classroom assignments.
This article attempts to quantify the bias that arises in VAMs that fail to control for the determinants of classroom assignments. The task is straightforward if classroom assignments are assumed to be random conditional on observable variables. My analysis indicates that simple VAMs that fail to control for the dynamic process of test scores, simply modeling differences in mean gain scores across classrooms, are substantially biased by student sorting. The bias is reduced-with a variance about 15 percent as large as that of teachers' true effects-in a VAM that controls for the lagged score and is further reduced when additional lagged scores are included as controls. Of course, there are costs to this: the more past scores that are required for the VAM estimation, the larger the share of students who will have to be excluded from the analysis sample for reasons of missing data. Moreover, if three years of lagged scores are needed for the VAM for fifth-grade teachers, what is to be done about estimating the value added by third-grade teachers, who see students before they have taken three years' worth of tests?
The analysis is more complex if we loosen the unrealistic assumption that all the information considered by the principal in forming teacher assignments is available in the research data set. I develop methods for assessing the bias when the principal is assumed to have access to a limited amount of information that the researcher cannot observe. I consider several scenarios for the information set and estimate the bias in three VAMs under each scenario.
A great deal turns out to depend on how the principal uses his information. If he weights past achievement to best predict measured gains, even a limited amount of unobserved information generates substantial biases in the sorts of VAMs that are commonly used. Richer models that control the full test score history rather than just a single lagged score reduce these biases, but only if the principal has very limited information about students' potential. With less restrictive assumptions, biases remain quantitatively important even in rich VAMs.
Of course, all of the analysis here (and in Rothstein 2008 and 2010, on which much of the analysis in section 4 is based) uses data on fifth graders in North Carolina. It is possible that the results would differ in other data. This seems unlikely, however. Anecdotally, principals everywhere are subject to pressure from parents seeking to manage their children's classroom assignments. The outcome of the resulting negotiations is unlikely to depend only on variables that are observable in the data sets used for value-added modeling. I therefore expect that the results here would generalize to other states and school districts where student-and teacher-level accountability systems have low stakes, as in North Carolina in the period from which my data were drawn.
Of more interest is the generalizability of my results to high-stakes settings. Any attempt to predict the effect of adding stakes to the value-added evaluation is necessarily speculative. But it seems reasonable to guess that strong incentives attached to student scores or teacher value-added measures would strengthen the general results here. In a high-stakes environment, teachers would be wise to lobby principals for students who are predicted to post large gains in the coming year, and principals would be tempted to use their control over classroom assignments to reward favored teachers. In general, one would expect more sorting on the characteristics that matter for the accountability system (i.e., lower σ 2 η in the model in section 6) and therefore even larger biases in the value-added scores.
Three recent studies have provided evidence that appears to validate observational value-added estimates. On closer examination, however, all are consistent with the presence of substantial bias in these estimates. Jacob and Lefgren (2008) and Harris and Sass (2007) compare value-added estimates with principals' subjective assessments of teacher quality, which might be assumed to reflect unbiased estimates of teachers' causal effects. Both papers find that the two measures are correlated, though far from perfectly. This indicates that there is at least some signal in the value-added estimates. But the weak correlations leave plenty of room for noncausal factors in the VAM estimates. compare estimates of teacher effects from a randomized experiment with observational estimates based on data prior to the experiment. They test the hypothesis that the (appropriately shrunken) observational estimate is an unbiased prediction of the causal estimate and obtain estimates consistent with this hypothesis. There are three important sources of slippage here, however. First, Kane and Staiger test a statistical hypothesis about the joint distribution of the true coefficients and the bias; while zero bias is consistent with the null hypothesis, so are large biases that are negatively correlated with teachers' true causal effects.
24 Second, Kane and Staiger's sample provides low power. Their standard errors are consistent with substantial attenuation of the prediction coefficient due to bias in the observational estimates. While their confidence intervals might rule out my scenario F (if biases are assumed to be uncorrelated with true quality), my more realistic scenarios are wholly consistent with the Kane and Staiger estimates but are nevertheless extremely troubling regarding the potential for bias in value-added estimates. Finally, the Kane and Staiger analysis is based on a carefully selected sample of pairs of teachers for which principals consented to random assignment. One might expect that principal consent was more likely when the two teachers would have been given similar students in any case. If so, the results cannot be generalized beyond the sample, even to other teachers at the same schools. The results here suggest that it is hazardous to interpret typical value-added estimates as indicative of causal effects. Although some assumptions about the assignment process permit nearly unbiased estimation, other plausible assumptions yield large biases. Further evidence on the process by which students are assigned to classrooms is needed before it will be clear which types of assumptions are closest to reality. The most recent such study, Monk 1987 , is now more than twenty years old. More recent evidence, from studies more directly aimed at the assumptions of value-added modeling, is badly needed, as are richer value-added models that can account for real-world assignments. In the meantime, causal claims will be tenuous at best. Glaeser, Brian Jacob, David Lee, and Diane Schanzenbach, and from comments from an anonymous referee. Financial support was generously provided by the Industrial Relations Section and the Center for Economic Policy Studies at Princeton University and by the U.S. Department of Education (#R305A080560).
APPENDIX: CALIBRATION METHODS
This appendix describes the methods used to calibrate the model developed in section 6. There are two steps to this calibration. First, given an assumption about the information available to the principal for use in predicting student outcomes, we need to obtain the coefficients on the variables (some observed and some not) in the prediction equation. Second, we use these coefficients and the across-classroom share of variance of the observed predictor variables to identify the parameters of the sorting process, in particular the importance of predicted outcomes to classroom assignments. Table 2 presents estimates of the prediction coefficients for scenarios A and B, when Y is the measured gain score. Estimates for predictions of true gain scores, measured without error, can be computed using omitted variables formulae. The computation for scenario A illustrates the method. Here, we hope to recover the coefficient from a regression of the true grade g gain on the measured lagged score, (Note that this is identical to (A3) when k = 0.) When Y is instead the measured gain, the coefficients on the measured history will deviate from those for the k other histories. The correction for the presence of correlated measurement error in the dependent variable and one of the independent variables is again straightforward. Scenarios E and F differ, in that not all of the coefficients can be estimated directly. The prediction coefficients for measured and true past achievement are in scenario D. The coefficient on the additional prediction variable G can be normalized to one, as variation in this coefficient is equivalent to variation in f, the ratio of the principal's information about the component of gains that is orthogonal to the achievement history to the information contained in that history.
ESTIMATING THE PREDICTION COEFFICIENTS
RECOVERING THE SORTING PARAMETERS
With estimates of coefficients for predictor variables with known variance, it is trivial to compute σ 2 I . The next step is to estimate the extent to which students are sorted across classrooms on the basis of I. I assemble the Z variables (past test scores) into a single index Zπ , using coefficients that correspond to the principal's prediction in the relevant scenario. The choice of scenario pins down cov(I, Zπ ). We can recover σ 
Note that the denominator here is simply the across-class variance of Zπ .
